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The Locus of Our Dis-ease:  
Narratives of Family Life in the age of 
Alzheimer’s 
LUCY BURKE  
 
Alzheimer’s and the distance between parents and children were both 
diseases of contemporary life, unlikely to go away (Hegarty 1995: 132) 
 
The spectre of Alzheimer’s disease (whether its legitimacy as a 
category is accepted or contested) dominates contemporary popular cultural 
discourse around both ageing and dementia. The historical trajectory of this 
diagnosis, from its initial description in 1901 by Alois Alzheimer as  ‘a 
peculiar disease process of the cerebral cortex’,  to the name of a dementia 
‘epidemic’ in the latter stages of the twentieth century has been attributed to 
the conjunction of a complex of disciplinary, economic, social and political 
factors. The medical anthropologist, Lawrence Cohen, explores the 
medicalization of dementia as one effect of the development of Geriatric 
medicine as a distinct research field that needed to separate “normal” 
ageing from particular disease pathologies. “Senility” as Cohen puts it, “is 
split into the existential condition of “normal aging” and the purified 
pathology of dementia” (2006, p5). This disciplinary ‘will to power’ also 
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intersects with the economic interests and burgeoning power of global 
pharmaceuticals from the mid twentieth century onwards and the 
identification and development of potentially lucrative new markets. 
Alongside this, is the emergence of new and powerful constituencies such 
as the American Seniors Association, and advocacy groups in the UK such 
as The Alzheimer’s Society each of which organise themselves around this 
kind of model of normal and pathological aging and make their claims for 
social, political and economic recognition on this basis.   Medical 
sociologists such as Jaber Gubrium  identify one of the ‘functions’ of the 
medicalization of dementia as a way for caregivers to manage the more 
disruptive aspects of the behaviour of the person with dementia (1986). The 
division of the disease into a series of stages, each with its own 
characteristics, provides a narrative structure in relation to which the 
experience of the disease can be plotted (often regardless of whether the 
behaviour and symptoms of the person with dementia actually follow this 
model).  As Cohen notes, “one of the dynamics of the age of Alzheimer’s is 
its apparent total biologization of senility: internal disease processes 
become not only the necessary but also the sufficient ground of all reasoned 
conversation on the recognition of behavioural change in late life” (2006, 
p7).  The key point here is that the way we talk and think about dementia 
today is inseparable from the assimilation of a disease model that is 
produced, reproduced and reinforced across a range of sub-disciplines and 
emergent medical technologies: neurology, genetics, geriatric medicine, 
neuro-psychology, psychiatry.   Dementia is no longer perceived to be a 
natural consequence of aging (despite the fact the incidence of dementia 
increases exponentially with age) and this shift in thinking, buttressed by a 
nexus of institutional practices, and research agenda and economic 
pressures and interests, has profound effects upon the perception and 
experience of living with this condition. 
Alzheimer’s, in this sense, is not simply the name of a disease, it is the term 
around which a whole assemblage of problems and possibilities circulate. 
Crucially, it operates not only as the site upon which a range of bioethical 
debates are played out but as a form of cultural production in its own right. 
Across multiple locations Alzheimer’s – as we now know it -- has produced 
new commodities, new institutions, new markets, new alliances, new 
identities, new problems, and new creative possibilities. This essay aims to 
address the distinct contribution of literary culture and of a cultural 
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materialist critical practice to our understanding of the political and ethical 
implications of the biomedicalisation of dementia upon the concept of 
family and attendant notions such as dependency, obligation, choice and 
individual agency. With close reference to Margaret Forster’s Have the 
Men Had Enough? (1989), a novel produced at the beginning of the so-
called Alzheimer’s epidemic‘ of the last twenty five years, this essay sets 
out to explore the ways in which “Alzheimer’s” as a historically distinct 
way of thinking about dementia, serves to articulate concomitant 
transformations in the concept of family, including notions of familial 
obligation, personal choice and the meaning of care.   
The essay begins by locating recent governmental representations of the 
‘dementia challenge‘ in the context of the broader economic, political and 
social changes effected by neoliberalism. This provides the context for a 
consideration of the ways in which Forster’s novel begins to articulate the 
emergent perceptions of dementia care that now dominate public discourse; 
a notion of caring as somehow discontinuous with normative familial 
relations and as an impediment to the flourishing of those around the person 
with dementia.  
  
The Alzheimer’s Show 
 
The flyer for The Alzheimer’s Show (16-17 May 2014), “the UK’s only 
dedicated exhibition and conference for carers, relatives and professionals 
living and working with Alzheimer’s and dementia”  promises to bring to-
gether “over 60 dementia and care exhibitors” at the Olympia  conference 
centre in London. The show is sandwiched between the usual Olympia fare 
of bridal shows, forensics and counter terror expos – the combination of 
which befits the sentimental yet intrinsically violent logic of our current 
historical conjuncture and stands as a sad indictment of it. At £10 in ad-
vance and £16 on the door (with £1 off for concessions), tickets are less 
costly than usual but the pricing scheme and the marketing information on 
the website regarding projected visitor numbers and their professional pro-
file underlines the commercial nature of the project. With its combination 
of service providers, specialist retailers, and inspirational lectures from 
“high profile speakers”, The Alzheimer’s Show crystallises a number of 
key transformations in contemporary thinking about dementia. First, it un-
derlines the degree to which the way in which we talk and think about de-
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mentia today is inseparable from the assimilation of a disease model (Alz-
heimer’s) as the dominant category through which we make sense of cogni-
tive impairment in later life. Secondly, it is indicative of a set of social and 
economic transformations surrounding the concept of care and indeed ill-
ness itself. The presence of a range of exhibitors comprising “expert” care 
providers and retailers specialising in the production of “tailor-made” prod-
ucts for people with dementia are markers of the movement of the concept 
of care from a primarily affective and private domain (the family) to the 
world of trained professionals, goods and services, “customer satisfaction” 
and statutory frameworks.  
This shift demonstrates the extent to which the biomedicalisation of demen-
tia occurs in tandem with a process of marketization in which the provision 
of services, service providers and particular commodities are addressed to 
individuals or health providers as consumers. In other words, the logic of 
the market and its values infiltrates the experience and perception of what it 
means to live with dementia. The  “age of Alzheimer’s” is characterised by 
the emergence of a whole economy of preventative and therapeutic inter-
ventions, pharmaceutical and alternative treatments (from Aricept through 
to Zinc) and products aimed at the ever growing market for dementia relat-
ed goods. One exhibitor at the Alzheimer’s Show offers expensive jigsaws 
and picture books on the basis that these products have been developed in 
the light of years of experience and ‘research’. One sees here in the evoca-
tion of ‘research’, the rhetorical appropriation of a discourse of expertise 
entirely continuous with the notion of Alzheimer’s as a complex and intrac-
table problem for medicine. The unique selling point of this kind of con-
sumer good resides primarily in an investment in the idea that it is the 
product of specialist expertise beyond the powers of ordinary people; in 
other words, this particular jigsaw differs from those superficially similar 
eleven piece jigsaws bought for recreational rather than therapeutic purpos-
es: in every ‘crisis’ a marketing opportunity. 
What I am trying to capture here is the way in which the medicalization of 
dementia and its entry into popular discourse as “Alzheimer’s” has a range 
of effects, not least in the formation of new markets, new commodities and 
new investment opportunities. Indeed, the ideological investment in the 
promise of a cure for this thus far incurable condition serves as one of the 
most powerful ideological legitimations for a range of ethically contested 
practices from stem cell treatments to genetic research.  Tracey Crouch 
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(Conservative Member of Parliament for Chatham and Aylesford) in a de-
bate in the UK parliament (28 November 2013) drew upon this kind of 
promissory discourse in order to argue for increased investment in global 
pharma: “The Government must do more to promote the commercialisation 
of research as these companies become a vital part of the ecosystem” (Han-
sard, 28.11.13). This manoeuvre indicates the ways in which “Alzheimer’s” 
as a disease that currently exposes the limits of modern medicine is evoked 
in order to justify particular entrepreneurial, free-market practices (which, 
in turn, are presented as organic, “a vital part of the ecosystem”). The fact 
that the promised cure is always “just around the corner” makes this form 
of speculation (both imaginative and financial) all the more seductive. De-
mentia recast as Alzheimer’s Disease marks the horizon of current research 
and thus its most compelling justification.  
 
A very neoliberal  condition 
The transformations that I have been describing point to the intersection of 
contemporary Alzheimer’s culture (by which I mean the discourses, prac-
tices, representations and political rhetoric that constitute and flow from 
this disease model) and the economic and political doctrine and practices 
that characterise neoliberalism. Referring to the proposition that free mar-
kets, entrepreneurialism, private property and an ethic of individual choice 
should be the guiding principles of politics and economics, the neoliberal 
policies first introduced in the UK by the Thatcher governments of the 
1980s (and continued under Tony Blair’s New Labour and the current Con-
servative/Liberal Democrat Coalition) focus primarily upon the dismantling 
of the welfare state and the social consensus upon which it was founded.  
The tenet of social or collective responsibility thus gives way to a celebra-
tion of the unencumbered individual free to “choose” to interact with mar-
ket as he/she so wishes. Choice, in other words, becomes synonymous with 
consumption, and the individual agent with the consumer. As Fredric Jame-
son (1991) notes “the slogan of the market and its accompanying rhetoric 
was devised to secure a decisive shift and displacement from the conceptu-
ality of production to that of distribution and consumption” (266). One of 
the reasons why this shift is so successful in ideological terms is that it is 
accompanied by a comprehensive metaphysical outlook that equates the 
mechanisms of the free market with human nature. Thus Gary Becker 
(1976), one of the most prominent neoliberal ideologues, remarked “I am 
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saying that the economic approach provides an invaluable unified frame-
work for understanding all human behaviour” (14). We see echoes of this 
rhetoric in the comment of Conservative MP Tracey Crouch cited above in 
which the commercialism of research is recast in organic terms as an aspect 
of our “ecosystem”.  
The consequences of these shifts are complex but profound to the degree 
that the ideological logic of the free market has come to permeate and trou-
ble conceptions of human connectivity at a very fundamental level. Beck-
er’s notion that human nature itself both underpins, reflects and legitimates 
his particular vision of laissez faire economics offers a model of human so-
ciality wherein both public and private, formal and affective ties are shot 
through by the discourse of the market.  In Liquid Love (2003), Zygmunt 
Bauman explores the extent to which the language of economic losses and 
gains, investment and risk has come to permeate popular discourse around 
love and relationships: 
 
A relationship, the expert will tell you, is an investment like all the 
others: you put in time, money, efforts that you could have turned to 
other aims but did not, hoping that you were doing the right thing and 
that what you’ve lost or refrained from otherwise enjoying would be 
in due course repaid – with profit. You buy stocks and hold them as 
long as they promise to grow in value, and promptly sell them when 
the profits begin to fall or when other stocks promise a higher income 
… If you invest in a relationship, the profit you expect is first and 
foremost security (Bauman 2003: 13) 
 
Bauman’s discussion of the proliferation of self-help guides and relation-
ship manuals in which love itself is conceived of and mediated by a utilitar-
ian and instrumentalist language of the business transaction, the cost/benefit 
analysis and strategic risk management offers a vision of contemporary cul-
ture characterised by a constitutive insecurity. In the contemporary “domain 
of life politics”, he notes, “floating coalitions and drifting enmities are ex-
pected to coalesce for a time, only to dissolve once more and make room 
for other and different condensations” (ibid: 34) . This reduction of love 
and relationships to a form of exchange (the idea that we must “get some-
thing back” from our love object or else move on to a more ‘profitable’ 
partnership) has significant implications for attitudes towards care and re-
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sponsibility for others who are unable to reciprocate according to the logic 
of this ‘contract’. We see the consequences of this idea at work in popular 
discourses around the personal costs of caring for a disabled or chronical-
ly/terminally ill ‘loved one’. For instance, in her blog Dating Dementia, 
Nancy Wurtzel notes, “I’ve realized that without the first-hand experience, 
it is difficult to fully comprehend how dementia can ruin lives”.   Like 
many similar bloggers, Wurtzel’s representation of the experience of care 
giving produces two bodies and two forms of suffering, that of the disa-
bled/ill person and that of their carer. In this scenario, care giving itself is 
perceived as a form of suffering but crucially one that is often deemed to 
eclipse that of the disabled or ill person themselves; in other words, this is 
the suffering that matters both socially and emotionally, with that of the 
disabled/ill person all too often placed under erasure. Without wanting to 
understate the impact of increasingly unsupported care-giving upon peo-
ples’ lives and relationships my point here is that there is a continuity be-
tween the incorporation of the language of the market into conceptions of 
human relationships and current perceptions of care/caring as intrinsically 
burdensome and discontinuous with ordinary emotional and familial bonds.  
The language of the online community that has developed around the “Alz-
heimer’s epidemic” is characterised by the language of deficit 
(loss/erosion/decay) and of personal ruin which crystallises around the fig-
ure of the parent/partner who fails to recognise the identity of their carer. In 
this instance, the ‘tragedy’ of dementia is popularly conceived of on the ba-
sis that conventions of exchange and thus of reciprocal interest are funda-
mentally violated.  
The shift in conceptions of human filiation described by Bauman as a form 
of “liquid love” intersects with the political incorporation of an identity pol-
itics stripped of its collectivist aspirations and reworked as self-realisation 
or the priority of the individual to realise aspirations regardless of differ-
ence or the “protected characteristics” enshrined in equal opportunities leg-
islation. In Invented Moralities (1995), Jeffrey Weeks identifies this as an 
unintended consequence of the ideology of the free market, noting that “if 
you have an absolute freedom to buy and sell, there seems no logic in 
blocking a freedom to choose your sexual lifestyle, your identity or your 
fantasies” (Weeks 1995: 28). If this explains the superficially contradictory 
recognition of gay ‘rights’ (via the pink pound) by Conservative admin-
istrations in the UK, then it is important to emphasize the degree to which 
14 | LUCY BURKE 
 
this process is contingent upon the postulation of a relationship between 
“rights” and spending power. The ideological power of neoliberalism is tied 
to an assertion of the “end of history” apparently manifest in the end of the 
class struggle as conceived of in Marxist political thought (cf.Fukuyama 
1992). However, the social consequences of this economic and political 
doctrine play themselves out in the decimation of “the protected coverings 
that embedded liberalism allowed” and the establishment of “flexible la-
bour markets” based upon “short term contracts, chronic job insecurities, 
lost social protections and often debilitating labour” (Harvey  2005: 168 & 
170).  The production of “disposable workers” (Harvey 2005: 170), “human 
waste” (Bauman 2003(a) & and 2003(b)), “surplus humanity” (Davis 2007) 
or “revolting subjects” (Tyler 2012) expose the disjunction between the 
ideological self-representation (and thus legitimation) of neoliberal eco-
nomic policies (as the key to “self-realisation”) and the violent consequenc-
es of their implementation for the working class, poor women, migrant 
workers, disabled people and ethnic minorities such as the Roma.  
We can identify the place of Alzheimer’s in this formation in the rhetoric of 
David Cameron’s recent “Dementia Challenge” launched in the UK in 
March 2012. Describing dementia as the “one of the most important issues 
we face as a society”, Cameron states his determination “to go further and 
faster on dementia – making life better for people with dementia and their 
carers, and supporting the research that will ultimately help us slow, stop 
and even prevent the condition”(Cameron 2012:3). The foreword to the 
policy document frames the problem of dementia from the perspective of a 
personal empathy for the individual’s experience of living with the condi-
tion. “Imagine”, he notes, “feeling confused and afraid because close 
friends and relatives seem like strangers; being unable to leave the house 
alone because you might not be able to find your way back; or seeing the 
fear in your loved one’s face, as they struggle to make sense of familiar sur-
roundings” (ibid). However, the staged familiarity of this rhetoric belies a 
strategy that exposes some of the most acute fault lines in neoliberal dis-
course. Although this document opens with an appeal to the difficulties ex-
perienced by individuals in the face of dementia, the strategy itself is ori-
ented around a primarily economic evaluation of the ‘cost’ of care.  The 
government site devoted to improving care for people with dementia notes 
that the disease costs the economy £23 billion a year and estimates that by 
2040, the number of people affected is expected to double - and the costs 
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are likely to treble. This reframes the notion of the impact of dementia upon 
the individual in favour of the assertion of an imminent resource crisis. In 
fact, the current and projected ‘costs’ of the “Alzheimer’s epidemic” does 
not actually represent real spending but represents a figure of which 55% is 
accounted for by estimating the value of work done by unpaid carers. It 
therefore serves a primarily ideological function as far as it represents what 
appears to be a very large sum of money, the allocation of which will have 
significant social and economic effects. (It is worth bearing in mind here 
that current funding of the NHS amounts to £108.9 billion per year). 
It is also important to note here that Cameron’s more recent speech calling 
for global action against dementia uses the resource implications of demen-
tia to call for closer relationships between medical researchers and the mar-
ket, the incentivising of “partnerships between science and business” and 
tax breaks for any company that creates “intellectual property in the UK”.  
Presenting dementia as “one of the greatest threats to humanity”, Cameron 
draws upon the disease model of dementia in order to justify the further in-
cursion of market forces into health care provision in the UK on the 
grounds that the solution to the problem of dementia lies in investing in 
global pharma and biotechs. 
Whilst the Dementia Challenge strategy document details funding opportu-
nities and a range of dementia initiatives, the notion that the lives of those 
with dementia and the work of their carers should be supported is brutally 
undercut by the coalition government’s onslaught on welfare spending in 
the name of “hardworking tax payers”. The effects of the latter objective 
mean that precisely those individuals and families whose emotional needs 
are apparently paramount are actually the subject of a swathe of cuts to lo-
cal government funding and social care budgets. Research by Fernandez, 
Snell and Wistow on changes in the patterns of social care provision in 
England between 2005 and 2013 identifies widespread reductions in the pe-
riod, amounting to a 26% reduction in the number of recipients of care 
(Fernandez et al 2013). One might view this as a failure of ‘joined up think-
ing’ or alternatively as an indication of the appropriation of the ‘problem’ 
of dementia for particular ideological ends in so far as the spectre of Alz-
heimer’s offers a powerful image of the social and economic effects of the 
demographic changes we face thus justifying a range of austerity measures. 
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It is not incidental that “Alzheimer’s” emerges into public consciousness as 
the name of a medical, social and economic crisis in waiting in the same 
period that sees the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in the 
UK under Thatcher and the USA under Reagan.  A review of journal arti-
cles in the MEDLINE database indicates that the concept of care as burden 
(and of “caregiver burden as a recognised construct in this scholarship) 
emerges in precisely this period alongside the process that sees dementia 
re-constellated as “Alzheimer’s Disease”. The first journal article to de-
scribe the various costs of dementia care was published in 1980 (Zarit et al) 
and contributions to this ‘problem’ have proliferated since then in tandem 
with the kind of societal shifts I touch upon above. We also need to view 
this particular notion of the costs of care in conjunction with what can only 
be described as a relentless will to legislate around care and care-giving in 
the post-war period. This is something that has occured alongside the divi-
sion of care into various domains of expertise and which has operated ac-
cording to a ‘top down model’ in which the people who require support are 
deprived of much of a say in the matter. In terms of dementia, there are, of 
course, reasons for the emergence of this so called ‘crisis of social care’ 
tied to the demographic shifts and problems of longevity identified in every 
piece of literature on dementia that one comes across. However, what I am 
interested in exploring here is the way in which this particular way of think-
ing about dementia as “Alzheimer’s Disease” comes to articulate a broader 
range of societal transformations and the ideological tensions that traverse 
them. This is to argue that Alzheimer’s operates as a key ideological ele-
ment not only in contemporary debates around the perceived crisis in social 
care and the consequences of an ageing population in terms of resource but 
also in our understanding of the affective dimensions of care and of the 
family as its traditional locus. It is here that I would argue an engagement 
with the imaginative literature of the age of Alzheimer’s provides an im-
portant critical insight into the political and ethical implications of the bio-
medicalisation of dementia upon ideas of family and attendant notions such 
as dependency, choice and self-realisation.  
 
Structures of feeling 
I want to turn here to the concept of ‘structure of feeling’ – which is a term 
developed in the work of Raymond Williams, a scholar whose contribution 
to the elaboration of a politically engaged critical practice (cultural materi-
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alism) cannot be overstated. I think that an engagement with Williams’ 
work allows us to interrogate the debates about Alzheimer’s that I have 
been talking about in relation to the cultural forms (ideologies) through 
which people understand both themselves and the world around them. For 
Williams (1977), the challenge faced by critics is the tendency of any ana-
lytical or critical description to transform its object into something finished 
or complete, “formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” 
(128). What this fails to grasp or encapsulate, he suggests, is what he calls 
the “undeniable experience of the present”, the space “within which we 
may indeed discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, positions but 
not as fixed products, defining products” (ibid). His aim here is to identify 
forms of “feeling and thinking” which whilst “social and material” are not 
fully articulate or definite (ibid.131).  This endeavour is, in part, about ac-
knowledging social and cultural process and the interplay of what he terms 
dominant, emergent and residual elements in any culture, but it is also 
about acknowledging those elements of experience, forms of consciousness 
or feeling that fall outside systemic beliefs/world views and institutional 
practices. Structure of feeling, for Williams describes the “cultural hypoth-
esis” through which he endeavours to capture this tension between systemic 
elements and emergent social experience. His interest in imaginative litera-
ture is in its capacity to capture this sense of dynamism and in its reflexive 
engagement with the interaction between societal and regulatory structures 
and interpersonal, social and cultural formations. His argument is that the 
ways in which language and the experiences it encapsulates are mediated in 
literary discourse through the use of particular generic and formal conven-
tions and techniques serves to expose the kind of ideological tensions and 
changes in meaning that are often “masked by a nominal continuity.” (ibid) 
 
My reading of the imaginative literature that has emerged in tandem with 
the Alzheimer’s epidemic of the last twenty years confirms Williams’ 
recognition of the significance of imaginative literature in the expression 
and negotiation of the tensions between what he calls “practical and official 
consciousness” and emergent ways of “feeling and thinking” (ibid.131).  
One point that needs underlining is the fact that the incorporation of Alz-
heimer’s into popular consciousness produces a plethora of novels in which 
the consequences of caring for someone with dementia and its impact upon 
familial relationships is placed at the centre of the narrative rather than at 
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its periphery. This is to say that dementia and caring become significant 
enough problems to initiate narrative rather than provide merely contextual 
detail. This shift arguably reflects the extent to which the biomedicalisation 
of dementia and thus the separation of this form of cognitive decline from 
notions of “normal” ageing constitute it as a qualitatively different experi-
ence. The obligation of family members to look after each other which, in a 
sense, goes without saying in earlier periods, suddenly emerges as a prob-
lem around which questions of choice, guilt and coercion coalesce.  Marga-
ret Forster’s (1989) Have the Men Had Enough offers a meticulous anato-
my of the emotional and social pressures that circumscribe care and de-
pendency as they are played out, predominantly amongst the women in a 
family in which the grandma is increasingly incapacitated by dementia. The 
narrative alternates between the first person narrative perspectives of 
grandma’s daughter in-law, Jenny, and Jenny’s daughter, Hannah. In so do-
ing, it enables an exploration of different perceptions of the difficulties of 
caring as they are experienced by each woman, each at a different point in 
their life and each with different degrees of responsibility for others. How-
ever, this very structure also presents the meaning of care and the limits of 
familial obligation as potentially irresolvable problems in that these differ-
ing narrative perspectives cannot be resolved into a singular response. 
There is a sense throughout the novel that grandma’s dementia presents the 
family with an intractable problem for which no obvious solutions are 
forthcoming.  It is also worth pointing out that Forster portrays care as a 
problem for everyone except the disabled recipient and object of this dis-
course – grandma – who is not given any kind of voice but whose needs are 
at the centre of the narrative as it unfolds. 
In the novel, Jenny’s perspective is informed by what is presented as an in-
tuitive but problematic desire to protect her husband from the practical and 
every day aspects of care-giving,  by her occasionally fraught relationship 
with her teenage children, and by a tense combination of obligation and ir-
ritation towards both grandma and Bridget, her husband’s sister and 
grandma’s primary carer. Her narrative account of the trajectory of grand-
ma’s decline and death in residential care moves through a whole raft of 
emotional responses from the anger that characterises displaced guilt 
through to frustration and despair. In contrast to this, her daughter Han-
nah’s narrative records the family’s relationship to her grandmother’s needs 
at one remove: she is involved with aspects of her grandmother’s care, but 
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is not an active participant in major decision-making, nor is she expected to 
shoulder the kind of responsibility that her mother and her aunt, Brid-
get,take on. Her narrative is often interrogative, organised around a series 
of questions that primarily revolve around her desire to make sense of 
Bridget’s relationship and commitment to her mother: 
What I want to know is:  
How can Bridget stay so cheerful? 
How can she forsake Karl for Grandma? 
How does she manage to spend any time with Karl at all? 
Why does she not want to spend more? (Forster 1989: 132) 
Hannah’s questions structure a critical response to Bridget’s commitment to 
her mother’s care through the adumbration of a set of concerns about the 
quality of her happiness and the conduct of her relationship. Her specula-
tions implicitly suggest that Bridget cannot really be cheerful and that she 
should prioritise her relationship with Karl. This evaluation of her aunt’s 
choices is arguably shaped by the kind of broader cultural assumptions  
about the priority of some relationships over others that I identified earlier 
in my discussion of Bauman’s (2003) concept of ‘liquid love’.  Hannah’s 
questions are underpinned by a partially articulated notion that caring for 
the elderly is intrinsically burdensome and unproductive; in other words, 
spending time with grandma is not only incompatible with “cheerfulness” 
but it is also inappropriate given the presence of Karl as a more suitable ob-
ject of affection.  Significantly, Hannah also voices an uncompromising cri-
tique of her mother’s desire to ‘protect’ her father and brother from the day- 
to-day difficulties that caring for grandma presents.  In this respect, Hannah 
vocalises what could be described as a feminist critique of the traditionally 
gendered dimensions of caring but does so from a position that is infused 
by a characteristically neoliberal conception of the individual as the locus 
of all value. (Bridget’s choices are incomprehensible to her niece precisely 
because they appear to sacrifice self-fulfilment for filial obligation). 
A significant proportion of Forster’s novel is devoted to the articulation of 
different familial responses to grandma’s need for care. This is primarily 
oriented around the ways in which these responses are shaped by a combi-
nation of particular and contingent factors–gender and the economic di-
mensions of care clearly play a role, as do personal choice, family history, 
and other unforeseeable and contingent events. This multi-perspectival ap-
proach underlines the extent to which there is no disinterested or neutral 
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position from which to address the difficulties with which the family is pre-
sented.  Yet it also appears that these emotionally charged responses are 
preferable to the so-called ethic of professional detachment. This emerges 
clearly in the descriptions of the locked ward in which grandma eventually 
dies. Here Jenny’s narrative describes a malignant social environment that 
reduces individuals to problems or inconveniences whilst over-stretched 
staff struggle to meet the needs of their charges: 
 
No one came forward to greet us but it was tea time, everyone was busy. 
All the old women were seated round a long table being fed. There were 
four staff for the twenty women. The noise was terrible–wild cawings as 
though a clutch of rooks had settled there. One woman banged all the time 
with a spoon on the table and another shouted, ‘About bloody time! About 
bloody time!’ over and over. I pushed Grandma to the table, glad that I was 
behind her and could not see her face. The four staff members, in yellow 
overalls, stared at us, I asked if the Matron was around. I said we were ex-
pected. One of them went off, grudgingly it seemed and came back with a 
small squat woman in a blue and white uniform … While she addressed 
me, a white-haired sweet-faced old woman got up from the end of the table 
and shuffled down to stand beside me. She put her hand on mine and made 
some sound I could not distinguish. ‘Go away, Leah,’ the Sister said. ‘Go 
on, off with you, don’t bother the lady’. I said she wasn’t bothering me and 
asked Sister what she had been trying to say to me. ‘She’s deaf,’ Sister said. 
‘Nothing she says makes sense, don’t let her bother you, it doesn’t bother 
us.” (ibid: 202) 
This passage is interesting in that it registers discomfort at the indifferent atti-
tude of the ward Sister towards her patients but also expresses a degree of 
collusion with this perspective at the level of the descriptive language that 
Jenny uses to describe the women she sees.  Her description of “wild cawings” 
and the transformation of the women into “a clutch of rooks” is echoed in the 
Sister’s reduction of Leah to her deafness and her description of the “sound” 
that Jenny “could not distinguish” as nonsensical.  This language serves to 
reduce the women they describe and their endeavours to communicate into 
something meaningless and animal. Indeed, it is interesting here that Jenny’s 
descriptive language enacts a far more violent assault on the personhood of the 
women she views than the Sister’s impatient, professional indifference.  The 
whole passage expresses a violence at the very level of representation that 
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underlines the malignant effects of this particular kind of institutionalisation 
and its impact upon people with dementia.  There is a kind of horror in this 
related to the de-individuation that characterises the organisation of social care 
and the structural asymmetry of the professional caring relationship. The ward 
provides the women with basic elements of ‘care’ – food, security and help 
with washing and dressing – but does so without paying any attention to the 
particularity of the person. It is interesting to note that Jenny states some relief 
that she cannot see grandma’s face – as if the exchange of glances would con-
fer a degree of mutual recognition at odds with the dehumanisation of the other 
women and thus the decision to place her on the ward.   
The culture of the locked ward is deliberately contrasted with the love manifest 
in Bridget’s relationship with her mother in the sense that this embodies a form 
of care that is reciprocal and symbiotic; interdependent rather than dependent. 
Bridget does not conceive of her responsibility towards her mother as a burden-
some obligation.  However, this kind of relationship is presented as both atypi-
cal and unsustainable. It is precisely the notion that Bridget’s desire to care for 
her mother is, in itself problematic, that serves as the catalyst that prompts 
narration. This very fact implies that this choice is both questionable and trou-
bling enough to merit (and to sell and to market) a novel. 
Forster’s novel was published in 1989 prior to the kind of debates around wel-
fare that are currently dominating governmental and media discourses but 
during the high point of Thatcherism and the particular form of individualism it 
fostered.  The novel also predates the legal recognition of the rights and needs 
of non-professional carers in the UK. However, we can see in the younger 
character Hannah’s narrative an endeavour to work through the relationships 
between her notion of the priority of the needs of the individual, gender politics 
and the problem of caring for someone who is no longer able to care for them-
selves.  What I think we see emerging in Forster’s novel is a fundamental shift 
in the notion of the family as the locus of care. This is evident in the very fact 
that the narrative focuses only upon the disputes, suffering and difficulties that 
emanate from the last stages of grandma’s life. It is taken as read that the pres-
ence of a dying relative causes problems for the family, particularly those 
members of the family whose residual sense of obligation precludes them from 
simply putting grandma in a residential home.  Operating alongside this, is the 
idea that Bridget’s decision to place the care of her mother at the centre of her 
life precludes her from realising what should really matter in the form of “self- 
interested” choices with regards to career aspirations and romance.  We see 
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here, in embryonic form, the articulation of a notion of relationships as primari-
ly instrumental or reducible to some kind of cost/benefit analysis. In other 
words, when Hannah asks why Bridget chooses her mother over her relation-
ship with Karl, the question is oriented around the belief that the relationships 
that matter are those that involve “getting something back” for oneself.  This 
perception of the priority of individual need over ones responsibility to others 
is bound up with the belief that supporting another represents a threat to per-
sonal autonomy. Bridget is certainly presented as making puzzling and frustrat-
ing choices as far as the rest of the family is concerned –her desire to care 
produces guilt, anger and occasionally pity but it is always the site of discord. 
 
A question of form 
In his analysis of late capitalism, Fredric Jameson (1991) describes a formation 
in which there is no longer any space or hinterland that operates outside the 
logic of the commodity. The major subjective consequence of this is increased 
atomization and reification. These are phenomena that begin in the period of 
capitalist modernity when small scale production is replaced by the division of 
labour in the industrial factory system and later processes such as post-fordism. 
This process reaches its height in our contemporary juncture with the kind of 
commodification of affect described by scholars such as Hardt and Negri 
(2000) and a culture in which  the logic of the marketplace permeates life itself 
to the degree that everything from our Amazon browsing history to Facebook 
status updates are incorporated into the production of surplus value. In Have 
The Men Had Enough? we see how the family itself, especially the new gen-
eration in the shape of Hannah relate to the world in fundamentally individual-
istic terms. We can trace this through the use of the narrative technique of point 
of view. As Jameson argues, this narrative device emerges alongside the devel-
opment of the nineteenth century novel and functions both as a reflection of the 
social and subjective experience of atomization, mediating “between the “su-
perstructures” of psychological or lived experience and the “infrastructures” of 
juridical relations and production process” (Jameson, 2006, p.140), and as an 
imaginary compensation for this experience. The key point here is that alt-
hough capitalism is about class rule, the interpellation of the individual is a 
crucial element in its ideological project; the notion that the individual is at the 
origin of meaning and action in the world both occludes the reality of class 
struggle and confers an illusion of individual agency. In earlier forms of liter-
ary realism (the set of conventions that underpin Forster’s novel), the use of 
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point of view or focalised perspective is often framed within an omniscient 
third person narrative. For better or for worse, this form of narration serves to 
articulate a sense of shared communal values or class consciousness that oper-
ates ‘outside’ the narrative, and therefore serves to orient, anchor or stabilise 
the position of the reader in relation to an ethical or political evaluation of the 
text. However, the use of different narrative perspectives in Forster’s novel is 
not framed by a third person perspective – and this is indicative of a loss of 
shared values or sense of collective endeavour at the heart of the family itself.  
What the novel plays out then, is an incapacity to orient individual experience 
in relation to those structural coordinates that determine the ‘quality’ of that 
experience. We are offered different perspectives on care but little sense of the 
wider social, economic and political determinants that underpin these percep-
tions and practices. At the level of both content and form, Forster’s novel is 
unable to provide any kind of imaginary resolution (to borrow Jameson’s for-
mulation in The Political Unconscious) to the questions it raises. The only way 
the story can come to a close is with grandma’s death  -- an event which oper-
ates outside the logic of the plot which is primarily driven by the conflict be-
tween the different family members.  Far from addressing the problems of care 
that both Jenny and Hannah’s narratives explore,  this conclusion simply re-
moves the origin of the problem but does so in a way which does not affect any 
particular transformation or learning on the part of the family. There is a sense 
here that the novel cannot move beyond the cognitive/cultural limits of the 
model of ageing, dependency and dementia that it -- at times -- appears to 
critique.   
The novel raises two questions then. First, what do we understand by the con-
cept of family in the age of Alzheimer’s?  And second, related to this, what do 
we understand by notions such as autonomy and individual self- realisation in 
this context?  There is an obvious paradox in the notion that caring for a family 
member is at odds with the needs and aspirations of the individual and that the 
necessity to care somehow disrupts one’s desired life narrative in that the reali-
ty of our ultimate and inevitable impairment always already consigns these 
beliefs to failure.  However, it also gives rise to a culture in which to be disa-
bled or old or chronically ill is to be an “unfair burden”; to be that which im-
pedes or disrupts the fantasy of unfettered autonomy for the family member 
charged with your care. One sees in this what Slavoj Zizek describes as the 
onslaught of instrumental/objectivised ‘alienated’ public exchange’ into the 
private sphere wherein support for another is reduced to its cost in a whole 
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number of senses. Ultimately it is the person with dementia – grandma -- who 
embodies the problem, rather than the ways in which her dementia is perceived 
by the different family members and in the narrative as a whole.  The novel 
plays out the failings of the social care system, questions the vestigial sexism 
that shapes both the men’s (and Jenny’s) attitudes to this problem and express-
es the nascent effects of the kind of individualism that Thatcherism fostered, 
verbalised in Hannah’s narrative.  However, the particular conception of de-
mentia at its centre means that it remains caught between the logic of these 
positions and is therefore unable to move beyond them to imagine a new soci-
ality or collective response to the problem of caring and its impact upon the 
way we think about family relationships and the meaning of love itself. 
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